University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 3

English Courts and Transnational Islamic Divorces: What Role for
Personal Liberty of Muslim Women?
Ilias Bantekas
Hamad bin Khalifa University (Qatar Foundation), Georgetown University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Part of the Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Ilias Bantekas, English Courts and Transnational Islamic Divorces: What Role for Personal Liberty of
Muslim Women?, 12 U. MIA Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 1 ()
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol12/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.

English Courts and Transnational Islamic
Divorces: What Role for Personal Liberty of
Muslim Women?
Ilias Bantekas*
English courts consider the validity of a talaq obtained abroad on
the basis of the lex matrimonii, without examining whether the
circumstance of the divorce, both factual and legal, offend English
public policy. An anthropological inquiry into talaq obtained in
most Muslim nations reveals that androcentric culture – as
opposed to religious prescription as such – largely distorts the
Quranic vision of this institution. This author suggests that
English courts and the scholarly/religious community should
entertain the notion of the contractual nature of nikah (marriage)
in order to assess the consequences of the talaq. If a nikah is
entered into without the wife’s unequivocal consent or under
duress from family members then, as a contract, it may be
declared voidable by the courts; the wife, however, would retain
the right to seek redress from such a voidable contract. Moreover,
besides comity and reciprocity, there is no other legal impediment
as to why English courts cannot employ the Human Rights Act to
counter foreign talaq obtained in violation of the wife’s
fundamental human rights. This is particularly so where the wife
repudiates the application of her personal law in favour of English
family law, provided that this is done in a manner that does not
expose her to accusations of apostasy.
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INTRODUCTION

English courts have traditionally had a hard time with Islamic law and
Islamic traditions. Up until the early 1980s, their approach was
characterised by a degree of suspicion and public policy1 was often used
to annul or prevent Islamic family law institutions or court rulings from
being applied within the English legal system.2 It is to be noted, however,
that this was at a time when the notion of transnational family law, even
within the European Union (EU), was not apparent. Moreover, the use of
public policy was not meant to be used as a human rights defense to protect
‘victims’, but rather as a way of showing that the institution under attack
was not acceptable in the English legal order. Nevertheless, the
proliferation of transnational divorce disputes before English courts
changed these antiquated attitudes. The legal profession had much to gain
from this development and it is no wonder that London soon became the
divorce capital of Europe. As a result, judicial attitudes towards talaq and
other Islamic family law institutions altered rapidly. Since the 1990s,
English courts were more than happy to accept jurisdiction over talaq
disputes,3 but more importantly, not only did they stop referring to public
policy, they failed to identify blatant abuses of talaq to the detriment of
women.4 English courts thus investigated whether the talaq process
applied by the male applicants was consistent with the law and practice of
their personal law5—which in many cases was based simply on the
pronouncement of the particular court issuing the talaq—without
investigating whether the effects of the talaq were abusive and stripped

1

See M. L. Novicoff, Blocking and Clawing Back in the Name of Public Policy: The
United Kingdom’s Protection of Private Economic Interests against Adverse Foreign
Adjudications, 7 NW J INT’L L & BUS 12, 15 (1985).
2
See Law Commission for England and Wales, Family Law. Report on Polygamous
Marriages (Law Com No 42, 1972) (Polygamy is illustrative of this approach, where
English courts were unsure how to handle a practice lawful under the subjects’ personal
law, but abhorrent under English law); see also Law Commission, Private International
Law: Polygamous Marriages—Capacity to Contract a Polygamous Marriage and Related
Issues (Law Com No 146, 1985); Prakash Shah, Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law, 52
ICLQ 369 (2003).
3
See Sekhri v. Ray [2014] EWCA Civ 119 (holding a husband and wife were both
legally domiciled in England, despite the fact that the couple had married in India and lived
in Singapore since they married).
4
See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW INTO THE
APPLICATION OF SHARIA LAW IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 2018, Cm. 9560, at 6 (UK) (In
England, for example, a nikah marriage, while valid under Islamic law is not recognized,
or indeed registered); see also CATHERINE FAIRBAIRN, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
ENGLAND AND WALES, 2020, HC 08747, at 3 (UK) (In the event of the relationship
collapsing, the wife has no claims to property or support).
5
See generally JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS (3d ed. 2009).
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the woman of most of her rights.6 In other words, the courts gave no
credence to the fact that the same set of circumstances would have been
unacceptable under English law.7 This stance is even more surprising
because it took no consideration of the long-standing practice of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right to family life. 8
The kind of abuse that this article intends to shed light on concerns the
ability of Muslims—chiefly females—to forego their so-called personal
law, namely Islamic law, in the event of a family dispute before a secular
court.9 While this may not be possible in a Muslim state, this is not the
case in secular states. One’s (Muslim) personal law is not an immutable
status; rather, it is a form of self-identification and personal selfdetermination that both the subject, as well as the courts, can bypass if said
personal law causes unnecessary harm to the subject without its free and
informed consent. This means that a Muslim should be able to bypass
Islamic family and inheritance laws and institutions in favor of the forum’s
secular laws, without, however, being deemed to have foregone their
Islamic faith. English courts can protect such a person from being branded
an apostate by emphasizing that the Islamic institution in question was
abusive, and hence, ordinary English law was applicable in the case at
hand. However, the ability to forego one’s Islamic personal law was a
taboo topic not only in respect of English courts, but also of all European
courts, out of fear of offending Muslim sensibilities. All this, hopefully
changed through the ECtHR’s judgment in Molla Sali v. Greece. There,
the applicant, a member of Greece’s Muslim minority of Western Thrace,
6

This is not to argue that English courts overlook abuses, but to highlight that there is
a long line of precedent where remedial measures were taken in the face of injustice. See
e.g. the doctrine of presumption of marriage where a nikah-only marriage was not
registered in Piers v. Piers [1849] 2 HL Cas. 331, 9 ER 111; Hayatleh v. Mofdy [2017]
EWCA Civ 70; Serife Yigit v. Turkey [2011] 53 EHRR 25 (the Grand Chamber of the
ECTHR held that the absence of registration of a nikah marriage in Turkey was irrelevant
for the right to family life under Art. 8 ECHR).
7
Certain institutions that would be discriminatory under English law are generally
acceptable because of long-standing tradition under Islamic law, which are not amenable
to the abusive dictates of particular qadis or courts. By way of illustration, in Sunni law,
the father is the guardian of the minor’s property, failing which this role is assumed by the
paternal grandfather, while the mother possesses no such right). See Imambandi v.
Mutsaddi, (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 73 (India)
8
See Ridwanul Hoque & Morshed M. Khan, Jud. Activism and Islamic Fam. L.: A
Socio-Legal Evaluation of Recent Trends in Bangl., 14 ISLAMIC L. AND SOC’Y 204 (2007)
[India] (The questioning of Islamic family law has occurred before progressive courts of
Muslim nations, particularly when felt to be in the interests of children).
9
See Rajnaara C. Akhtar, Unregistered Muslim Marriages in the UK: Examining
Normative Influences Shaping Choice of Legal Protection, PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN
PLURAL SOCIETIES: A PRINCIPLE AND ITS PARADOXES 140 (Marie-Claire Foblets, et al. eds.,
2019).
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had concluded a will before a civil notary just before the death of her
husband.10 The will excluded the deceased’s two sisters, who claimed that
recourse to a civil notary was contrary to the personal (Islamic) law
minority members under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.11 The ECtHR
emphasized that denying members of a religious community to exit the
minority’s legal constrains and resort to regular law has a discriminatory
impact and further violates the right to self-identification.12The Court
relied on international law to make the point that the protection offered by
minority law did not have the effect of subjecting group members to a
particular cultural or legal regime without their consent.13 The purpose of
this article is to demonstrate how existing English judicial practice has
been inconsistent with Molla Sali, and in fact, has not only offended
Muslim women in many cases, but did nothing to remove the abusive
elements of talaq and harmonize it under English family law.14
Divorce in Islam takes three forms: (a) talaq ahsan, whereby the
husband’s repudiation of the wife occurs when she is not menstruating and
he has not had sexual intercourse with her; (b) talaq hasan, which involves
a thrice repudiation of the wife in periods consisting of at least three
menstrual cycles, and; (c) talaq bid’a, which is variation of the second
option whereby the thrice repudiation occurs in a single occasion.15 The
third type is generally dismissed by Muslim scholars as not only finding
no place in the Quran but also for being in conflict with the spirit of Islamic
law.16 The regulation of talaq and its place in Islamic family law is by
means of particular verses in the Quran and by a significant body of hadith
10

Molla Sali v. Greece, App. No. 20452/14 (Dec. 19, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188985.
11
Id. at ¶11.
12
Id. at ¶157.
13
Id. at ¶¶ 154-57.
14
See Nasreen Akhter v. Mohammed Shabaz Khan [2018] EWFC (Fam) 54, [2019] 2
WLR 771 (Eng.) (The couple had concluded a nikah-only marriage, which was not
registered. When the relationship collapsed the husband argued his spouse was not entitled
to any support or part of the family estate because there was a “non-marriage.” The London
Family Court, and in particular Mr. Justice Williams, looked beyond the formalities and
held that the nikah marriage was “void” for the purposes of Section 11 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973. By not declaring it a non-marriage, the spouse was not excluded from
the family estate and her rights to family and private life under Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) were fully protected.)
15
See MAAIKE VOORHOEVE, FAMILY LAW IN ISLAM: DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND WOMEN
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (2012).
16
See generally Sharaya Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 (India) (The Indian
Supreme Court dismissed talaq bid’a as unconstitutional because it violated Articles 13,
14, and 15 of the Indian Constitution); see also SALMAN KHRUSHID, TRIPLE TALAQ:
EXAMINING FAITH (2018) (ultimately leading to the adoption of the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act in 2019).
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(oral tradition). Even so, the requirement of the thrice utterance is not
evident from a simple reading of the pertinent verse (sura al-talaq).17 In
theory, two witnesses are also required for the completion of the talaq,18
but it is not clear whether their presence is required for all three utterances
in the case of talaq hasan. Equally, there is no clear mention in the primary
sources, especially in the Quran, as to whether the utterances need to be
uttered to the wife or another person, or whether there is a requirement to
receive notice of some sort prior to the registration of the divorce. The
practice, of course, varies from school to school and from Sunni to Shia;
this is also reflected in the statutory regulation of talaq in Muslim
jurisdictions.19 However, the spirit of the Quran is evident; the process is
not meant to release the husband by any means and for his sole benefit but
to respect and protect the person of the wife unless she has transgressed
her marriage obligations. This spirit, as will be demonstrated in subsequent
sections, is missing from the theory and practice of contemporary Muslim
divorce laws, which have as a result bred a culture of abusive nikahs and
talaqs.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the recognition of
foreign talaq by English courts. The examination of the pertinent law is
undertaken with the aim of establishing and understanding the attitudes of
the stakeholders, namely the spouses as well as that of the judges.
Therefore, a significant part of this paper involves some degree of
anthropological inquiry. This is necessarily subject to the limitation that
the author does not have access to his subjects and has not spent time with
a community of male and female divorcees in order to study their attitudes
at the time of marriage or following their divorce. Nonetheless, from a
methodological point of view, it is fortunate that the majority of judgments
on talaq, maintenance and child custody involving Muslims with a foreign
element have involved a thorough examination of the parties’ lives and
circumstances from the moment of the completion of the nikah contract to
the pronouncement of the talaq and beyond. Hence, we are left with a
historiography of the parties’ relevant time periods, as well as substantial
excerpts from their statements as to their social circumstances in these
periods. These are important because they provide a fairly accurate picture
of the cultural circumstances of both the nikah and the talaq, as well as the
social status of women and men from a sociological and anthropological
perspective. Religion, as will become evident, plays a very small part, if
at all, in this analysis, precisely because the real contours shaping the talaq
are quintessentially cultural. Given that the objective was to provide an
17
18
19

Quran 65:1.
Id. 65:2.
See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 1998).

2021]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

7

overview of relevant practices the author limited himself to a sample of
approximately fifteen representative cases. This by no means constitutes
exhaustive research, nor do the outcomes provide universal truths,20 which
is in any event part and parcel of reflexive limitations inherent in the study
of one human being by another.21 The sample is largely limited to
relatively young Muslim women married abroad and against whom talaq
was equally pronounced abroad.
The first section of the paper identifies the treatment of foreign talaq
by English courts, stressing their observance of Islamic law, irrespective
if this would otherwise offend the forum’s public policy.22 We then go on
to paint the parties’ attitudes to the divorce and its surrounding
circumstances. The picture that arises is that of a distinct talaq culture
where men abuse their right to initiate divorce and take full advantage of
male-centred laws and practices to effectuate divorce without, in many
cases, even telling the wife. The wives, on their part, narrate their
exclusion from the talaq process and those that played little part in their
nikah explain the life and expectation of a woman in a traditional
androcentric society. What is striking in the latter cases is the
transformation of the wives’ aspirations and livelihood following arrival
and stay in England as compared to their former existence. The conclusion
aims to employ the anthropological observations with a view to offering
two interrelated suggestions. The first assumes the nikah in its original
contractual form in Islamic law and presents it as such for the purpose of
recognition and enforcement of the talaq. In this sense the talaq is nothing
more than the possibility of repudiating a contract which both parties have
accepted on the basis of (an assumed) party autonomy. Although the
governing law will be that of the country where the nikah was completed,
the courts of England and Wales will not be impeded in an assessment of
the contract’s fairness and should be able to import fundamental notions
of justice and contract law to ascertain whether it is void or voidable.
Moreover, human rights law (if not also public policy rules) should play a
distinct role in the construction of foreign talaqs where the wife’s role in
the original marriage contract was minimal and the husband is given
unlimited power by foreign local laws and practices to obtain a divorce.

20

Indeed, social sciences cannot produce universal and immutable truths. This is true of
the socio-anthropological methods employed in this paper. In order to produce a holistic
picture that is as little biased as possible, this author refers to an arranged marriage to which
the husband was opposed, but this serves to confirm the general hypothesis. See Sohail
Babar v. Anika Anis [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1384 (Eng.).
21
KAREN O’REILLY, ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS 17-18 (2d ed. 2012).
22
Lucy Carrol, Talaq in Eng. L.: Bare Talaqs, Proc. Talaqs and Pol’y Consideration in
Recognition of Extra-Jud. Divorces, 28 J. OF THE INDIAN L. INST. 14 (1986) [India].

8

II.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:12

THE STATUTORY STANCE TO THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
TALAQ

Article 46(1) and (2) of the Family Law Act 1986 regulate the
recognition of overseas divorce, annulment and legal separation in
England.23 The position is simple enough. A talaq obtained outside
England is enforceable therein—and hence the parties may further seek
ancillary relief or resolve other financial matters—if the talaq is effective
under the laws of the country in which it was obtained (lex matrimonii).
This is irrespective if it was obtained my means of proceedings24—
whether judicial, religious or other—or by no proceedings whatsoever, as
long as residency requirements are met, which need not concern us here.
The focus, therefore, is not on the existence of proceedings leading to the
pronouncement of divorce or other forms of legal separation, but rather
whether the particular talaq is effective in the country obtained. Although,
as will be seen later in this paper, English courts have clarified what
constitutes effectiveness for the purposes of English law. The term should,
in theory, be construed in a manner that renders a talaq operative, that is,
of producing legal effects for the parties. This can certainly be achieved
without a formal registration, especially where the existence of a talaq is
typically demonstrated in the country obtained by means of oral testimony.
Such an approach would be consistent with the flexible and to some degree
informal nature of talaq under classical Islamic law, not to mention its
practice in many Muslim nations, i.e. the utterance of divorce thrice to the
spouse or relatives without the need for further formalities.
The fact that English courts have required some type of registration on
the part of the parties as a prerequisite to recognition demonstrates that
their focus is on legal certainty and formality as this is understood in
western legal thinking—not on giving credence to all the particularities of
talaq in its native legal context. In Sulaiman v. Juffali the husband argued
that a bare talaq in Saudi Arabia did not require a process of registration
being it is a matter solely between man and God.25 In fact, the husband
argued that the absence of an obligation to register talaq was part of Saudi
legal practice and that the wife’s argument to the contrary went against
their culture and societal values.26 In the later case of H v. S, the husband
had failed to register his talaq, arguing that no such obligation existed.27
23

Family Law Act 1986, c. 55, §46 (UK).
See El-Fadl v. El-Fadl [2000] 1 FLR (Fam.) 175 (Eng.) (it was accepted that, under
Lebanese law, a talaq requires pronouncement before two witnesses, followed by
registration; this was recognized as constituting a proceedings divorce in England).
25
Basma Sulaiman Al Sulaiman v. Walid Ahmed Al Juffali [2001] EWHC 556 (Fam),
[9]-[10], [2002] 1 FLR 479 (Eng.).
26
Id. at [27]-[29].
27
H v. S [2011] EWHC (Fam) B23 [32] (Eng.).
24
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Acting upon expert evidence, the court was of the view that although
Islamic law in Saudi Arabia did not (at the time at least) impose a
registration requirement, in practice “this is unheard of”.28 It went on to
say that regulations increasingly require official proof of divorce, and as a
result, unless proof of registration is furnished, the talaq is non-existent in
England.
In most Muslim jurisdictions the registration of talaq or nikah
(Muslim marriage contract) is not viewed as a legal requirement under the
primary sources of Islamic law. This view has been expressed, for
example, by the Pakistani Federal Sharia Court, emphasizing that oral
evidence is sufficient for the determination of a nikah and that a
requirement to register was un-Islamic.29 The purpose of registration was
relegated to filing purposes as a result. If this is true, then older cases, such
as Chaudhary v. Chaudhary, which held that the mere announcement of
divorce before witnesses did not amount to divorce proceedings under
Article 46(1), and are contrary to Islamic law developments and
construction in particular countries.30 Such an approach therefore belies a
desire for record-keeping, which is understandable, given that litigation
otherwise would depend on unreliable oral testimony, requiring the
translation of affidavits of people to whom the courts could not have
access. This is no doubt, sound from a policy perspective, that justifies a
departure from classical Islamic law. As the court went on to note in H v.
S, there does not exist a system of law in the world that does not register
divorces, as this would create a chaotic situation.31
As will become evident in other sections, English courts, in their
determination of the validity of talaq obtained abroad, have not concerned
themselves with questions of public policy, particularly whether the
conditions by which the talaq was obtained would in this jurisdiction have
offended the rights of women.32 For a variety of reasons, although the Law
28

Id.
Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan, (2000) PLD (FSC) 1 (Pak.).
30
See Chaudhary v. Chaudhary [1985] 2 W.L.R 350, [1985] Fam. 19.
31
See H v. S, EWHC (Fam) at [60]-[61]; see also NC v. Entry Clearance Officer [2009]
UKAIT 16 (Eng.) (holding on appeal that in the region of Kashmir, which is not subject to
the 1961 Pakistani Muslim Family Law Ordinance, there was no requirement to register a
bare talaq. Given that the husband and wife were both habitually resident in Kashmir when
their talaq was obtained, this was found to be valid under § 46(2) of 1986 Family Law
Act).
32
See N A v. M O T [2004] EWHC (Fam) 471 [2] (Eng.) (courts looked at the wife’s
disadvantaged position in the pertinent Muslim jurisdiction and examined the wife’s
options for divorce under Iranian law. It held that if the wife wanted a divorce in Iran, she
would have to negotiate the amount of the marriage portion she would have to forgo in
exchange for her freedom. If the price was too high, she would be forced to remain married
but in reality she would be separated. Ultimately, however, the court applied Iranian law
29
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Commission had favoured that all talaq manifestly contrary to public
policy be subject to discretionary stays by the courts, this view was
rejected from the purview of Article 46.33 Hence, the violation of
fundamental rights and the disparity of the parties in the relevant process
do not constitute impediments to the recognition of foreign talaq.
Adherence to the spouses’ personal law is considered paramount.34
Again, policy reasons suggest that non-recognition of a foreign talaq
obtained in violation of fundamental human rights would in fact be
injurious to the more vulnerable spouse.35 A recognition of talaq is more
female-friendly because it allows the wife to claim ancillary relief and
child custody against the husband, which she might not otherwise be
entitled to in the jurisdiction where the nikah and the talaq were
obtained.36 Practice before English courts certainly demonstrates that this
outcome has materialised, although the majority of cases decided that not
all women were destitute and at the sole mercy of abusive husbands.37
Given that in the vast majority of cases the husbands are aware that they
can easily obtain talaq in Muslim jurisdictions, whereas the khula is far
more cumbersome for women,38 they perceive this as a global advantage,
being oblivious to the fact that the recognition of a foreign divorce in
places such as England entails serious financial consequences.

and did not seek to deviate from it in order to alleviate the wife’s position); See also Otobo
v. Otobo [2002] EWCA (Civ) 949, [2003] 1 FLR 192 (Eng.).
33
H v. S, EWHC (Fam) at [29].
34
See El-Fadl v. El-Fadl [2000] 1 FLR (Fam.) 175 (Eng.) (the court overturned an earlier
ruling, emphasizing that it was not a proper exercise of discretion to refuse a divorce which
was valid under the personal laws of both parties at the relevant time, as had been known
to them for many years.)
35
See Alberto H. Neidhardt, Quis Custodict Ipsos Custodes? Personal Autonomy,
Forced Marriage and the Inherent Jurisdiction in English Law, PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN
PLURAL SOCIETIES 140 (Marie-Claire Foblets, et al. eds., 2019).
36
See Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2004] EWCA Civ
417 [63], [2004] 2 FLR 85 (Eng.) (the court noted that if the decision was for the child to
be returned to Saudi Arabia, this would have to be made conditional upon the father
obtaining talaq in a sharia court. It was emphasized that this is because it would not be in
the child’s interests that the “mother be required to return as a wife.”)
37
A distinct exception is the case of D B v. Z A et. al. [2010] EWHC (Fam) 2175 (Eng.),
which did not concern the determination of a talaq as such, but an illiterate Kurdish wife
that was abused by her husband, who divorced her by means of talaq and had connections
with the UK.
38
The khula is not only difficult to obtain but exposes the wife to the risk of losing her
marital property and depriving herself of maintenance. There are, of course, severe social
implications to be taken into consideration.
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THE UTTERANCE OF THE TALAQ: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
HUSBAND AND THE USE OF “CULTURE”

The courts have not taken a position on the utterance of the talaq,
primarily because of the policy considerations cited in the previous
section. Yet, for the purposes of this paper, the practice of the utterance
raises interesting anthropological questions. The fact that all that is needed
is a thrice utterance of divorce before a few witnesses provides men with
a perception of cultural and legal superiority over women, and in the
process, removes from them any sort of stigma associated with divorce.39
This is further reinforced by the notion that talaq is a spiritual matter
between man and God (although this argument is used sparingly) ,and so
in turn, gives the impression that no social consequences for the male
spouse arise from the talaq. Of course, one should not over-generalize, but
must instead see the talaq from the perspective of the direct stakeholders,
namely judges, the husband and the wife. As already stated in the
introduction, this author has relied on a selection of cases in order to flesh
out some anthropological observations. These observations in no way
suggest a conclusive outcome and should not be interpreted as such.
The absence of something akin to equality of arms is evident in the
practice of talaq in the Muslim world.40 In Sulaiman v. Juffali, we
discussed the husband’s claim that this was a matter between himself and
God and not for the courts.41 This reference by husbands to religion and
culture, as a basis for dismissing the applications of their spouses for
ancillary relief and other financial settlement, is prevalent in the vast
majority of cases. In practice, this socio-religious dimension of the talaq
has a direct impact on its regulation by the executive and the courts, which
may be far removed from its original conception in the primary and
secondary sources of Islam. In H v. H, the court revealed that although
under Pakistani law the husband’s failure to register the talaq was fatal to
its validity, the talaq was otherwise valid if the thrice utterance was never

39

There are of course notable exceptions. In H v. H [2007] EWHC (Fam) 2945 [74],
[2008] 2 FLR 857 (Eng.), it was held that: “on my assessment of the husband I think it is
unlikely that he would have entered a second marriage without divorcing his first wife.
This is so in particular when he was going to continue living in the community where he
was known. I do not consider that he would have run the risk associated with such a
course.”
40
See N A v. M O T [2004] EWHC (Fam) 471 [2(8)] (Eng.) (holding that although in
“theory” the wife is entitled to seek a divorce, maintenance and financial rights, this is nonexistent in practice. The burden of proof (essentially a breach by the husband of a term in
the marriage contract) is very high for the wife to succeed in bringing khula action).
41
Basma Sulaiman Al Sulaiman v. Walid Ahmed Al Juffali [2001] EWHC (Fam) 556
[27]-[29], [2002] 1 FLR 479 (Eng.).
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made to the wife but to third parties instead.42 Similar cases have arisen in
the case law. In Arshad v. Anwar, the husband instituted talaq proceedings
in England without notifying the wife or making an effort to obtain a
registration while at the same time entertaining talaq proceedings in
Pakistan without equally making any effort to notify the wife.43 Clearly,
the husband was under the perception, as well as legal advice, that
obtaining a talaq was a mere formality which could be dispensed at ease.
In the case at hand, the wife was unable, despite her best efforts, to even
find out if a talaq had been obtained.44 In A v. L, the spouses, originally
from Libya, had been together for a long time (close to thirty years) and
had raised a large family.45 They spent their time between England and
Egypt, with the husband conducting most of his business activities in Cairo
and, as a result, spent substantially longer periods there than the wife, who
remained in England during most of his business excursions.46 The
husband at some point became enamoured with a younger girl and began
an affair, while at the same time abusing and belittling his wife.47 While
in Egypt, he pursued talaq proceedings without notifying the wife,
although he claimed to have demanded a divorce over the phone.48 The
English court had no qualms arguing that the husband was dishonest and
devious in obtaining talaq in Egypt.49 Quite clearly, the husband’s
intention in obtaining a divorce in Egypt was in the knowledge that “the
maintenance rights of the wife [in Egypt] are of a most restricted kind”.50
In yet other cases, it was not even clear whether a talaq had been
obtained, even though the husband claimed as much although he admitted
not addressing his wife on the matter.51 In this case, the wife was illiterate
and was married off by her family, whereas in the situations described in
the preceding paragraph, both spouses possessed some degree of
education.52 The relative ease by which men can obtain talaq is further
reinforced by the ease they can shift through the requirements for nikah.
In Babar v. Anis, a British man with Pakistani roots was forced by his
family into marrying a Pakistani bride without his divorce in England
42

H v. S [2011] EWHC (Fam) B23 [38] (Eng.). As a result of its registration the talaq
in question was recognized in England. Id. at [86].
43
Arshad v. Anwar [2012] EWCA (Civ) 372 [4] (Eng.).
44
Id. at [14].
45
A v. L [2010] EWHC (Fam) 460, [2010] 2 FLR 1418 (Eng.).
46
Id. at [6], [7].
47
Id. at [40], [77].
48
Id. at [11], [49].
49
Id. at [79].
50
Id. at [35].
51
See, e.g., D B v. Z A et al. [2010] EWHC (Fam) 2175 (Eng.) (describing the closest
thing to a talaq was a paper discussing compensation with the wife’s thumb print on it).
52
Id.
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having become final.53 This was common knowledge to the families of
both spouses in Pakistan and when asked to sign the nikah certificate by
the imam, the husband was not asked all of the twenty-one questions on
the form, particularly whether he was currently married.54 Everything was
arranged by the parents and the imam in order to be convenient for their
ultimate purpose.55
A notable characteristic in most of these cases is the claim of the
husband that he was not particularly religious, yet adhering to the dictates
of local culture, much of which is influenced by religious considerations.56
In DB v. ZA et. al., the father claimed to be a secular Muslim, but
ultimately the court accepted that he, as well as his family, practiced
honour killings.57 In the same case, the maternal grandfather appears as an
honourable elder who is respected in the local Kurdish society and who
justifies a possible honour killing of his daughter based on the fact that he
gave his word to the husband’s parents that she be betrothed to him.58 At
the same time, however, there is significant evidence that the paternal
grandfather had an affair with a younger woman who gave birth to a child
but refused to marry her under pressure from his wife.59 He never once
made an attempt to see his illegitimate child and did not pay compensation
to his mistress despite his promises to the contrary.60 Yet, this is the same
man who professes that honour killings are part of the Kurdish culture61
and was intent on killing his daughter simply because she refused to be
with a man that raped, abused and threatened to kill her.
This liberal invocation of culture by the male husbands discussed in
these cases is emblematic of the fact that said “culture” is only meant to
favour men. It pervades societies in all aspects and social relations.62
Because male domination is more potently justified by reference to
culture, these men do not feel the need to rely to any great degree, if at all,
on religion. Indeed, they are quite aware that a strict interpretation of talaq
under classical Islamic law would not provide them with the same liberties
as under “culture”,63 which has in turn permeated the legal institutions of
53

Sohail Babar v. Anika Anis [2005] EWHC 1384 [4]-[9] (Ch) (Eng.).
Id. at [59], [84].
55
Id. at [81], [87]-[88].
56
See N A v. M O T [2004] EWHC (Fam) 471 [2(n)] (Eng.) (the husband claimed he
did not expect his Iranian wife to be a virgin because he was rather liberal having lived in
England close to twenty years. The judge did not accept this claim.)
57
D B v. Z A et. al. [2010] EWHC (Fam) 2175 [44] (Eng.).
58
See id. at [62], [278].
59
Id. at [257].
60
Id.
61
Id. at [277], [278].
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See generally id.
63
See generally id.
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divorce in the pertinent nations. Another explanation for minimising the
degree of their religious adherence is perhaps concerned with their
perception of English judges as being disinclined towards Islam and
Islamic law. They may well think that culture is neutral and therefore a
more attractive proposition. No doubt, these cases clearly demonstrate that
in local societies, where men dominate and dictate legal and social norms,
the conditions for talaq will never really amount to a proceeding in the
sense of Article 46(2) of the Family Law Act 1986, but a unilateral act that
has legal effect on third parties, namely wives. A statement from the wife
in DB v. ZA et. al., as redacted by the judge, on life in her Iranian-Kurdish
village is illustrative of this male-centred culture:
[She] describes coming from “a very orthodox Moslem background”.
She too expresses a belief in God, but is not herself religiously observant.
She speaks of being part of a household where the males can, in effect, do
no wrong. They govern all that goes on in the house. Women have no
rights. Strict conformity to “this cultural model” is required. She was
uneducated whilst her brothers were schooled. She was barely allowed out
of the home to mix in the local area, and not being schooled had no chance
to forge friendships there. She alleges that her mother was the victim of
the same autocratic methods within the household, and could not interfere
when her father and her brothers required her to behave in a certain way.64

IV.

JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO CLAIMS OF MATRIMONIAL
CULTURAL RELATIVISM

The husband in DB v. ZA produced a written document whereby he
alleged that one of the terms of the divorce was that he was designated as
his son’s carer.65 He justified this on the basis that it would be expected in
his culture because of the mother’s health issues and her behaviour
towards the son.66 He went on to argue that in any event his son would
pass to him at the age of 7 as a matter of tradition.67 The judge’s reaction
to this statement is revealing of the difficulties in understanding what
constitutes and feeds “culture” in societies traditionally associated with
theocracy and male dominance in the western psyche. Wood J, thus stated:
This remark is of some interest, for it shows that despite his posture as
a less than traditional member of his society, and with a belief in God but

64
65
66
67

Id. at [52].
Id. at [237].
Id.
Id. at [243].
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not a belief in the Islamic religion or its observances, he is at heart deeply
entrenched in the mores of his society.68
Wood J is at pains to comprehend how it is possible for a person not
to be religious in a society that cherishes religious adherence, while at the
same time fully observing that society’s mores and culture. The husband’s
belief system is by no means incongruous. Culture is a complex
phenomenon and scholars such as Geertz have viewed it as a web of shared
meanings expressed through public communication, not in the sense of
sharing the same knowledge and skills but in the sense that persons who
in fact share a culture share a common world view that is expressed
through common symbols and language.69 Hence, religion may be merged
into culture and become part of a shared view even though in its new,
cultural, form it is different from its original religious underpinnings.
Hence a person may observe religious rules without being religious
because the rules in question are part of culture. This in fact demonstrates
that in societies where men manipulate religious rules to their advantage,
as is the case with nikah and talaq, said rules are hardly axiomatic or
immutable. Rather, in a very implicit way they are not taken for granted
by the principal enforcers, that is, men. In turn, it is obvious that
immutability is afforded to cultural norms. This observation coincides
with Bourdieu’s distinction between doxa and opinion.70 For Bourdieu, in
order to assess whether the members of a group share or do not share
common values one must distinguish that which is taken for granted by
the group and which is beyond discussion (doxa), such as faith in God or
unquestionable adherence to a political system, and things that are actively
discussed among group members and are not therefore axiomatic
(opinion).71
Family court judges in England are experienced and despite having
entertained numerous talaq cases they allow the parties to produce expert
opinions on Islamic law. The problem is that the strict focus of Article
46(2) of the Family Law Act on compliance with local legal formalities,
which are in turn justified on Quranic grounds, does not allow judges to
examine, as opposed to simply cite, the place of culture in spousal
relations, other than as obiter dicta. But, of course, if culture was allowed
to play a meaningful role in talaq-related proceedings the judges would be
forced to apply human rights and public policy considerations in the
relations between the spouses.

68

Id.
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1st ed. 1973).
70
PIERRE BORDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164-70 (Richard Nice trans.,
Cambridge University Press, 1977).
71
Id.
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There are of course some notable exceptions to this general trend,
albeit the ultimate effect is limited. In NA v MOT the husband, a BritishIranian national went to Iran to marry and subsequently brought his new
wife back to Manchester.72 The marriage contract was drawn up and
officialised in Iran, listing twelve possible grounds upon which the wife
could seek a divorce from the husband.73 As has already been mentioned
in a previous section, given that obtaining a khula in Iran is exceptionally
difficult, if the wife wished to be released from her marriage she would be
forced to accept a considerable cut to her marriage portion, otherwise she
would have to endure a non-existent marriage.74 Upon accepting
jurisdiction, as well as the particular terms of the nikah, the court
emphasised that it was bound to take the cultural perspectives of the parties
into consideration, but only with a view to pronouncing fair financial
outcomes.75 This is essentially an anthropological approach, which merits
citation:
I also have to consider the cultural background of this case. . . . [A]
factor when carrying out the court’s function is to have regard to the
parties’ cultural mores. . . . [A]n English judge should give due weight to
the primary cultural factors and not ignore the differential between what
the wife might anticipate from a determination in England as opposed to a
determination in the alternative jurisdiction, including that as one of the
circumstances of the case. . . . Thus I will take into account the agreement
which the parties reached and determine how the Iranian court would have
been wont to deal with this case.
i. If the Husband had divorced the Wife by way of talaq or failed to
give her a divorce at all, then, in my view, in Iran she would be entitled to
retain the whole of her marriage portion.
ii. If the Wife wanted a divorce, because she does not have sufficient
grounds in Iran, she would have been bound to enter into a negotiation in
order to agree what percentage of her marriage portion, if any, she would
sacrifice for her freedom.
I take these matters fully into account.76
The court’s anthropological approach is limited as is undoubtedly its
assistance to the wife. What the courts can, and ought to, do in such
situations is apply the foreign law as this is found but import such an
Islamic interpretation that favours an equitable result. This is particularly
potent given that the theory and practice of talaq in the Muslim world is
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N.A. v. M.O.T [2004] EWHC [2(i)-(j)] (Fam).
Id. at [2(g)].
Id. at [2(h)(11)].
Id. at [6(f)-(g)].
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wholly divergent and there are very few scholars that would be prepared
to defy the express provision of the Quran which forbids a man to
unjustifiably and treacherously inflict a divorce on his wife, especially
without sufficient maintenance and financial provision.77 Some thought
must also go into scholarly input with regard to the wife’s contractual
status in entering into the marriage contract, especially where this is
repudiated unjustly and unfairly. Such a construction, however, requires
consent among the judicial and academic communities in the UK, as well
as an input from the entirety of the Muslim community in the country.
Unlike employment and immigration tribunals where judges have
demonstrated stereotypical attitudes towards Muslim men,78 this is not the
case with the family courts.79 The law in this area does not provide them
with the freedom to question culture, let alone dismiss it. In those cases
where the judges did discuss cultural issues it was solely from the
perspective of a neutral observer and where some criticism of the inferior
status of women was offered, this was always obiter dicta. As a result, the
courts have not given us any degree of anthropological observation and of
course it is not their job to do so. However, the Head of the International
Family Justice unit,80 currently Thorpe LJ, should perhaps engage in a
study with a view to ascertaining the aspirations of weaker parties to talaq
disputes settled in England and Wales, particularly where the nikah was
based on an arranged marriage in which the wife had little input. Given
that Brussels II81 does not apply to Muslim divorces obtained outside the
EU, English courts are not constrained by the particular dictates of this
Regulation. There is no reason why the Human Rights Act and ECHR
jurisprudence cannot inform talaq-related proceedings in England.
77

See Quran 65:1, 65:7-10.
In Abusabib v Taddese [2012] UKEAT/0424/11/ZT, the plaintiff was a prominent
Sudanese diplomat, a considerate family man, who was accused, along with his wife, by
his Ethiopian nanny of serious crimes, including attempts at forced religious conversion.
Despite character witness statements in his favour and a string of false statements by the
nanny, in addition to what was evidently an attempt by her to secure asylum, successive
employment tribunals refused to dispense justice in the case. No doubt, a Muslim,
Sudanese, diplomat, male is perceived in the same light as the press paints Muslim
diplomats and their entourage, especially from so-called pariah nations, without taking
personal circumstances into consideration.
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H v H [2007] EWHC 2945 (Fam) (noting that the social stigma for bigamy was so
acute in the husband’s community that it is improbable that he would have assumed such
a risk or course of action).
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International family justice, COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY ,
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/international/international-family-justice
(last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
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Council Regulation 2201/2003 (Nov. 27, 2003), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32003R2201 (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (it is
conveniently known as Brussels II or Brussels Iibis).
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THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE WIFE

It has already transpired that the aspirations of the wife are
inconsequential to the impact of a talaq obtained abroad, even against her
wishes or in the absence of her consent. To western lawyers the contractual
nature of marriage and the possibility of a unilateral repudiation by the
strongest party does not sit well with the very concept of marriage or the
equality inherent in the principle of party autonomy in its application to
contracts. It is assumed, for sound policy reasons, that irrespective of the
equality and fairness of foreign talaq law, the wife was aware of the
situation and her status from the outset. Hence, she is no worse off when
she comes before an English court than when she was in the country where
the nikah and the talaq were obtained. In fact, the subsequent remedies in
England and Wales, in addition to the input from social services and social
welfare, will ensure that her life is far better. We have also emphasised
that despite the ease by which a talaq is obtained by males this may in fact
turn out to be a blessing for the wife because it provides her with an
opportunity to free herself from the shackles of a violent, uncomfortable
and in many cases unwanted formal relationship.
The courts, although obiter dicta – except in cases that did not involve
the recognition of a talaq, as with protection measures to avert honour
killings – have not shied away from pointing out the inferior status of
wives-to-be in many Muslim communities around the world. In A v L the
court emphasised the restricted nature of maintenance rights affordable to
women in Egypt, even though in the case at hand the husband had clearly
committed adultery and had been abusive to his wife.82 In DB v ZA the
court accepted evidence suggesting that the wife’s marriage had been part
of an agreement between her father and another man, which although
clearly a bad marriage, was a matter of honour for the father; hence the
betrothed had no say in the matter.83 In J (A Child) the judge was willing
to accept that life for an educated, active, Muslim woman in Saudi Arabia
must be very restrictive, even if her husband is westernised and liberal.84
These are just a fraction of the cases where the courts have been at pains
to emphasise the inferior status of women both culturally and from the
perspective of equality of arms in talaq proceedings.
In all the cases where the wife was either a naturalised British citizen
or had just established her habitual residence in the UK there is a clear
trend. Whatever the cultural circumstances of the particular marriage, the
parameters of the talaq, or the level of education in every case the wife
82
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has sought to improve her personal situation. Despite being constrained by
the limitations of the Family Law Act which relies on the parties’ personal
law, and hence advice would have been sought that reference to rightscentred English family law would be inapplicable, the wives are eager to
demonstrate the injustice suffered from the male-dominated application of
talaq in particular and Islamic family law in general. As a result, it is not
far-fetched to claim that in the vast majority of cases wives perceive the
talaq as an unfair and biased process, something which is further
reinforced by the great difficulties inherent in obtaining a khula. Equally,
relatively younger wives exhibit a desire to make profound changes in
their lives upon coming to the UK. This has involved taking up primary,
secondary or tertiary education, setting up their own business, finding
independent employment (i.e. not having to rely on male maintenance) and
to a very large degree breaking some of the bonds with patriarchal and
socio-cultural structures associated with particular Muslim societies. To
this one may add a relatively steady, albeit probably small, number of
conversions to other religions, particularly evangelical Christianity and
Jehova’s Witnesses, although for obvious reasons there is very little data
on the subject. The fact that the younger generation of non-British Muslim
women against whom talaq has been sought in Muslim jurisdictions are
making a conscious break with their culture is indicative of the view which
suggests that several institutions and practices within the broader umbrella
of the Sharia are anything but liberating for women. In all of the cases
surveyed in this paper the female viewpoint, even if not expressly
stipulated, has been that the practice of talaq (and for some also the nikah)
and the manner with which it is allowed to exist is injurious to women.
The judiciary clearly identifies a problem between foreign talaq law
and culture. This problem is quite pervasive in anthropological research
and is not found exclusively in Muslim societies. It may be summed up as
follows: Where the established mores and social institutions of a particular
society are oppressive against one of its composite segments (religious or
racial minorities, women, aliens, etc) they are preserved as culture only on
account of the oppression and not because of a broader consensus. Of
course, the vast majority of those born within an oppressive culture and
who are unaware of the opposite side of the coin will seem to an external
observer as though they relish their status.85 This unfortunate state of
affairs is often the paradigmatic argument in favour of cultural relativism
in societies where the oppressed have no voice, no education and no
opportunities. In the case at hand, the culture of talaq seems at peace with
85

No doubt, there are those who do not espouse this view and instead see no oppression
of women within Islam or the use of sharia by men as a tool for oppression. See GABRIELE
MARRANCI, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ISLAM (Routledge, 2008).

20

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:12

the Muslim world’s universal culture, but this is only true within
traditional Muslim societies (even those living in Western nations). When
there is a departure from such traditional culture as a result of a talaq
decided in the UK, with the wife now living there, the wife no longer
supports the (male-centred) culture of talaq or its associated institutions.86
This should serve as an indication that if the talaq is indeed viewed as a
contract in English law, following its Islamic root, then the courts must
offer some thought on the underlying principles of party autonomy and
whether or not in many cases the wife is but a third party to such contract.
This notion is analysed slightly more elaborately in the following section.
Whatever the case, it is not wise to dismiss or ignore the intra-cultural
clash in Islamic family law, particularly in the areas of marriage and
divorce.

VI.

SOME SENSIBLE CONCLUSIONS ON THE BASIS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LAW OF CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS

There is a clear trend in Europe and English courts in particular
towards dismissing Islamic law as the governing law of contracts on the
ground that it is not the law of a national legal system and that in any event
it is far too indeterminate for the courts to consider.87 This is also true to a
large degree in the field of investment arbitration, despite the fact that
conflict of laws rules have no application there. Although such
interventions, both judicial and statutory, offend the cardinal principle of
party autonomy, they are justified on the basis of legal certainty.88
In the case at hand, a talaq premised solely on Islamic law could
equally be subjected to another governing law by the courts – assuming it
86

Talaq and related institutions could therefore be described in light of the theory of
androcentrism. Perkins Gilman who studies this phenomenon as early as 1911 described it
as a fixation on the male and masculine perspectives as the origin of all things and the basis
of culture and history. In this context only masculinity is normative whereas everything
else is described as other. See CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE MAN-MADE WORLD: OR,
OUR ANDROCENTRIC CULTURE (Cosimo Inc., 2007).
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See Beximco Pharmaceuticals v Shamil Bank of Bahrain [2004] EWCA [48] (Civ)
(justifying the outcome on the basis of Art 1(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which clearly states that it is applicable to
“contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different
countries”) (internal citations omitted).
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It is true that sometimes the courts go a bit too far in dismissing the parties’ contractual
desires, as was the case in Jivraj v Hashwani [2010] EWCA Civ 712 [28]-[29]. There, the
Court of Appeal held that the appointment of an Ismaili arbitrator in the parties’ arbitration
clause was void because it constituted religious discrimination in the sphere of
employment. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed this decision. Jivraj v Hashwani
[2011] UKSC 40.
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is regarded as a contract – but sole reliance on Islamic law as such is rare.
Modern talaqs are generally obtained by reference to the laws and
procedures of national systems of justice, irrespective of the fact that their
primary source is Islamic law given that the talaq originates from the
Quran. Yet, domestic family laws in Muslim nations as has been
demonstrated in this paper are far more indeterminate than general Islamic
law, where the pertinent regulation in the primary sources is undisputed.
In some of the cases surveyed it was not even clear if a talaq had been
pronounced, whereas in others the male party suggested that no formal
requirements were required and without exception expert witnesses were
invited in order to clarify the relevant laws. This in no way demonstrates
legal certainty in the Muslim jurisdictions under consideration.
Clearly, English courts must at least entertain the possibility of
examining the nikah as a contract, as this is its legal form in Islamic law
and national laws. On this basis, the nikah may be interpreted just like any
other contract, taking into consideration, of course, the financial and
personal relationships that accompany it.89 Just like any other contract, it
is subject to a governing law and the general rules underlying contracts,
including also their dissolution. English courts have exhibited their
adherence to Islamic law in contracts governed either by concurrent
English/Islamic law governing law clauses, or clauses governed by
English law, albeit where the subject matter of the contract was Shariarelated.90 Surely, where a party to a contract lacked the necessary volition
(i.e. there was no assent on the part of the wife) this fails to produce any
legal effects on account of being voidable. However, because of the
sensitive nature of the marriage contract, especially on the vulnerable
party, the wife should be given the opportunity to accept the terms of the
contract in order to retain her married status, which is essentially the
remedy afforded to the aggrieved party to a voidable contract.
Alternatively, if she were to decide that the nikah should be declared void
ab initio her marriage would be declared void (or voidable depending on
the classification of the breach) retrospectively, but given that element of
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See Ilias Bantekas, Freedom of Religion in Transnational Contract and Commercial
Transactions, in PETER PETKOFF ET AL., CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2013).
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In The Investment Dar Co KSSC v. Blom Development Bank S.A.L., [2009] EWHC
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compulsion91 she would be entitled to particular terms of compensation
and ancillary relief. Ordinary family law would regulate other matters,
particularly in respect of parental responsibility. This suggestion is
obviously a radical departure, which requires significant intellectual input
from the scholarly and religious community, particularly whether it is
deemed necessary for the wife to denounce her personal law – not her
religion - in favour of the secular family law of England.92
To avoid such problems, the courts may alternatively construe the
wife’s personal law in light of human rights principles if Parliament is
disinclined from allowing the courts to make public policy determinations.
This by no means requires a radical departure of the nature described
above and has pretty much been decided in Molla Sali.93 The application
of fundamental rights by the courts already constitutes an exception to the
principle whereby local courts are not permitted to offend international
comity by frustrating sovereign acts of foreign nations. If this were not so
then all members States to the ECHR would be forced to accept all rights
violations – from countries outside Europe – as valid and as a result one
would not be able to afford asylum to those subject to persecution. This is
clearly an absurd proposition. The House of Lords has authoritatively held
that a woman was justified in seeking asylum in the UK as a result of
discriminatory family laws in Lebanon derived from the sharia.94 There is
no question therefore that one’s personal law in no way trumps the
applicability of human rights and that such a determination by the courts
is not viewed as offending the rule of comity. However, in order for this
result to come about it is necessary for the wife to denounce her personal
law in favour of the lex fori, which, as already noted, may create more
problems for the wife both culturally and from the perspective of criminal
91

Depending on the legal system, the infliction of duress or threats may render a contract
void or voidable. In English law, three forms of duress are recognized, each of which enable
a party to rescind a contract on the ground that it has become void and hence the obligations
contained in it are no longer enforceable. The type of duress that is relevant in this context
is so-called ‘duress of the person’, although undue influence may also be applicable. See
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 (where the plaintiff had threatened to kill the defendant
if he refused to sell his shares in a company where the parties were joint shareholders);
equally Cumming v Ince (1847) 11 QB 112 (contracts are deemed void where they
encompass threats of restrain against one contracting party).
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law (apostasy).95 In such cases, the courts should adopt a common
construction to Islamic family law which imports human rights notions
without a need for the wife to denounce Islamic law as her personal law.96
Although this will alleviate all of the aforementioned problems it will,
most probably, open Pandora’s Box that renders England and Wales the
preferred matrimonial forum for dissatisfied Muslim wives across the
globe. Hence, it is crucial that the implications of this proposal be studied
carefully and that only the range of cases discussed here are allowed
through. Such an experiment may actually provide the necessary impetus
around the world for other nations to follow suit. Moreover, it is not
unlikely that in time civil society in the Muslim world employ these
developments in order to infuse more fairness in Islamic family law.97
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